Friday 31 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Turkish Stream Talks Reportedly Suspended, Delays Possible

Marshall Horn,

SOFIA, July 31 (Novinite) - Russia and Turkey reportedly suspended negotiations on the construction of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline.

According to media reports, the negotiations were suspended after Russia failed to sign a key agreement on the discount of gas prices.

Back in February, Turkey obtained a 10.25 % discount on the 28-30 billion cubic meters of gas it purchases from Russia. However the final signature has been dragging for months, Hurriyet Daily informs.

Turkish officials added that another point of disagreement in the negotiations has been the insistence of Russia that Turkey should grant permits for the construction work on four planned lines in the project.

So far, Turkey has granted licences only for the first line. Gazprom, which is the Russian partner in the project, declined to comment. 

Earlier on Wednesday, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak hinted that the construction of an underwater pipeline to Turkey could be delayed if a a related intergovernmental agreement was not signed soon.

Turkish Stream, which was proposed as a substitute to the cancelled South Stream pipeline, is projected to supply natural gas from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea.

The planned annual capacity of the pipeline is 63 billion cubic metres, with Turkey to take about 14 billion cubic metres, while the rest will be exported to Europe.


SOFIA, July 30 (Novinite) - Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak has said construction of the so-called Turkish Stream gas pipeline might begin later than planned.

There is a risk not to start building the pipeline’s first section on schedule the intergovernmental agreement is not signed in time, Novak is quoted by RIA Novosti as saying.

Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller had earlier explained that part of Turkish stream might become operational by December 2016, and his deputy Alexander Medvedev had added in April that the fourth (and last) section of the pipeline will be up and running by 2020.

This comes just a day after reports from Energy Ministry sources who say Moscow had sent to Ankara a document offering only an agreement on the first line of Turkish Stream. Apparently Novak did not comment on the claims. 

Construction of Turkish Stream from the Russian side was officially announced in May, this being the first time Gazprom is embarking on implementing such a project without an intergovernmental agreement and other documents needed. Technically building the pipeline could begin either in June or July, Novak had pointed out last month.

Turkish Stream was announced last year as a substitute to South Stream, a project which was designed to carry gas to Europe via Bulgaria and other Eastern European states but which was ditched by Russia over Sofia’s reluctance to issue construction permits.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Turkish Stream Talks Reportedly Suspended, Delays Possible

Thursday 30 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Turkish Stream Could Go Ahead at Partial Capacity

Marshall Horn,

Russia is currently ready to sign only an agreement to build the first section of Turkish Stream, Russian news websites quote an Energy Ministry source as saying.

This comes after reports that Moscow has sent a draft intergovernmental agreement to Ankara on the construction of a pipeline set to replace the abandoned South Stream project.

Turkish Stream is envisaged to carry gas from Russia along the bed of the Black Sea, like South Stream, but with Turkey hosting the landfall instead of Bulgaria. It was announced in December 2014 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who then cited the Bulgaria’s reluctance to unblock construction permits for its own coastal area. 

The cabinet source quoted by Vedomosti says that Turkey and Russia’s heads of state have agreed on a phased implementation of Turkish Stream. 

This means the gas delivered to Turkey through the first section (around 16 billion cubic meters) will be for domestic use, while the infrastructure that will deliver volumes for EU members will be arranged in a separate text.

Turkish Stream will have a maximum capacity of about 63 bcm, or roughly the same as the planned capacity for South Stream.

Earlier, Russia repeatedly warned Europe should prepare for a shift in gas transportation from Ukraine to Turkey, adding it would only use the latter as a transit country from 2019. However, reports from the last few weeks suggest Moscow might be abandoning the idea.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Turkish Stream Could Go Ahead at Partial Capacity

Marshall Horn - China Stock Market Crash Will Hurt Commodity Exporters Like Russia

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at LewRockwell.com


By any measure, the Chinese equity markets are in turmoil. The Shanghai Index, up 150 percent in a year and down some 30 percent since mid-June, was hit hard again Monday, losing another 8.5 percent — its second-biggest fall in its history.

The selloff continues despite weeks of unprecedented market-rigging stimulus measures by the Chinese government. They include pumping in more than $200 billion to buy failing shares, restricting short selling and halting trading of nearly 50 percent of stocks on the Shanghai Composite. Although hundreds of stocks have resumed trading since the restrictions were implemented, 126 are still blocked from trading.

Not only are its equity markets shedding trillions in investor losses, Goldman Sachs estimates some $225 billion of capital has flowed out of China in the second quarter.

But the word on Wall Street is that China’s steep market decline is just a correction, it won’t affect its overall economy, it’s a non-event on the grand scale and worries it’s signaling a worldwide market meltdown are overblown.

It is extremely difficult to forecast China’s stock-market trends, considering the overt and unprecedented rigging by the Chinese government — whose stated goal is to stabilize and ultimately increase stock prices.

However, we can forecast with certainty the fears of a global market panic extending far beyond the strength or weakness of China’s equity markets.

As we wrote in last week’s Trend Alert, the world’s second largest economy, “China – in midst of an economic slowdown, an equity market calamity and trying to keep its real estate bubble from bursting – absorbs some 50 percent of copper, iron ore and coal exports. Thus, nations rich in commodity resources, such as Canada, Australia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Russia, Nigeria, Angola, Chile and Indonesia, are in recession or heading into one as demand for their exports declines worldwide.”

China Syndrome

It’s a fact. Commodity prices have crashed and a corresponding currency crisis are clear trend lines leading to more than just stock market mayhem; it portends global economic turmoil and social/geopolitical instability.

The Bloomberg Commodity Index has fallen to 2002 levels and, along with falling prices, so too have currencies of resource-rich nations that mine and export those commodities. For example, Canada’s loonie has plunged to 2004 levels against the US dollar. The Aussie dollar and Mexican peso are at six-year lows. Brazil’s real is at 12-year lows and Indonesia’s rupiah is trading at 1998 levels. Even oil-rich Norway’s krone, which is pegged to the euro, is down nearly 10 percent since May.

It’s a very simple formula: When the United States and Europe buy fewer consumer goods, China manufactures less of them. And the less China manufactures, the fewer raw materials and agriculture goods they import from resource rich nations. As exports decline from resource rich nations their economies grow weaker, their currencies fall lower and the risks for social unrest and global stock market turbulence increase.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC China Stock Market Crash Will Hurt Commodity Exporters Like Russia

Wednesday 29 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Gazprom, Turkmenistan Locked in a Gas Dispute

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at OilPrice.com


Natural gas relationships are a bit like marriage. They are often long, expensive and ultimately very difficult to end. There could not be a better example than the energy relationship between Gazprom and Turkmenistan.

Although the country’s independence from the Soviet Union gave the newly-elected president, Saparmurad Niyazov, also known as Turkmenbashi (the Father of the Turkmens), exclusive control over the sixth largest natural gas reserves in the world, the government’s dependence on Russia to market Turkmen gas did not change. For most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkmenistan was selling the majority of its gas output, to Russia, with Iran being the next notable customer. With a lack of other export infrastructure, Russia’s vast pipeline network was the only export outlet for Turkmenistan.

Gazprom has typically played the role of alternative gas supplier for countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose organization of former Soviet republics. Gazprom was the necessary middle-man purchasing the Turkmen gas low and selling it at a lucrative margin. The exports to Ukraine were able to instill powerful gas intermediaries in Kyiv, who negotiated with Turkmengaz via Gazprom officials, reaping huge profits from reselling the gas on domestic markets. Hence, Gazprom was relieved from the burden of being a supplier of last resort to the CIS countries and managed to maximize profit on its own gas by selling it at high oil-indexed prices on Western European markets.

This scheme operated successfully with Ukraine at least until 2009 when the global economic crisis depressed demand making the additional Turkmen gas simply unnecessary. Deliveries were halted for months due to technical reasons.

Finally, in 2010, the state-owned Turkmengaz company and Gazprom signed a long-term take-or-pay agreement for the supply of 10 bcm of gas per annum (four times lower volumes than pre-2009) at US $240 per 1000 cubic meters.

Last year, though, Gazprom decided it does not need to “take” anymore. Gazprom’s CEO promised that he would cut commercial ties with Turkmenistan. Then in the beginning of 2015, Gazprom said it would buy just 4 bcm of gas per year and would challenge the long-term contract in the Stockholm arbitration court in an attempt to revise the purchase prices.

The reason for the sharp move was that the drop in natural gas prices in 2014, due to their oil-indexation, made purchasing Turkmen gas and then reselling it abroad, simply too expensive. Thanks to shrinking demand in the EU, amid economic stagnation, and energy efficiency improvements, Gazprom is seeking ways to diversify its trading structure.

Unilaterally, in the first half of 2015, Gazprom has started paying Turkmenistan the average European price instead of the agreed fixed price leading to around US $400 million in losses for Turkmengaz, according to the Turkmen energy ministry. Even if Gazprom wins the case, it is difficult to see how Turkmenistan would agree to abide by the court’s ruling.

The government in Ashgabat could respond by fully redirecting its gas supply to China, which already buys more than half of all gas exports via the Central Asia – China pipeline, whose capacity of 55 bcm/y is currently only used at approximately 50 percent capacity. China has also eyed higher gas imports from Iran in an attempt to meet its exponentially rising gas demand.

China is also helping Turkmenistan develop the supergiant Galkynysh field, the second largest in the world. Estimated to hold up to 21 trillion cubic meters of gas, it could potentially turn Turkmenistan into the third largest gas producer in the world. Commercial gas production already started in the fall of 2013 and the expectation is that Turkmenistan could export up to 65 bcm of gas to China by 2020. This strategy makes sense considering current forecasts predicting natural gas consumption to reach 10 percent of total primary energy supply by 2020 up from 5 percent in 2012. This comes on the back of Beijing’s attempts to limit pollution and diminish its dependence on coal for power generation.

The other alternative for Turkmenistan – namely to ship its gas westward to Europe – still looks highly unlikely. Despite EU insistence that a pipeline through the Caspian Sea should be built to link the existing Southern Gas Corridor with the Turkmen reserves, the outstanding dispute over the Caspian legal status prevents any major infrastructure project that is not supported by the five littoral states. Russia, in particular, has been most vocal in opposing new energy infrastructure in the Caspian, allegedly on environmental grounds. In addition, Turkmenistan lacks sufficient pipeline infrastructure to transport the natural gas from the Galkynysh field in the East to the Caspian Sea in the West.

With demand uncertainty in Europe rising, funding a major gas export project would be a leap of faith at best. Russia has already started learning this lesson the hard way as it realizes the economic futility of building enormous pipelines that have purely political goals.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Gazprom, Turkmenistan Locked in a Gas Dispute

Marshall Horn - Should Russia Ditch the Dutch Flower Monopoly?

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Dances With Bears


The Dutch auction, as it’s called in the wholesale flower trade of Europe, is a clever scheme which simulates competitive bidding while it hides premiums in the prices Dutch growers and traders rig for their flowers. To cut the cost of flowers you have to deadhead the Dutch. And that’s exactly what Russia is threatening to do this week.

The Dutch are crying foul. That’s what monopolists usually do when the game is up. In Dutch history going back to the time when the Amsterdam merchants held a monopoly on the world supply of nutmeg – a prophylactic against bubonic plague , it was believed at the time — they organized slavery, torture, and other atrocities to protect their nutmeg trading scheme. Before you jump to condemn the Russian phytosanitary authority for issuing a warning against Dutch flower exports, remember the Amboyna Massacre of March 9, 1623.*

Rosselkhnoznadzor (RSN), the state veterinary and phytosanitary agency in Moscow, has issued a request for the European Union (EU) to suspend its phytosanitary certification for the shipment of flowers from the Netherlands. Press reports describing this as an import ban are premature, RSN said yesterday. “The ban has not formally been introduced,” according to spokesman Yulia Melano. On the other hand, for practical purposes she concedes the ban has commenced. “We have only asked for consultation with our European colleagues. We have asked [them] to voluntarily and temporarily stop certification of this product for deliveries to the territory of Russia.” RSN has warned that if the EU will not do that, then RSN will formally introduce its own ban. RSN spokesman Alexei Alexeyenko said last week the talks with the EU phytosanitary officials had yet to start.

The Monday, July 27, announcement from RSN claims the reason for the import control request is that infestation has been discovered in more than half of test lots of cut flower imports from the Netherlands over the past three months. One of the culprits identified by RSN inspectors is the western flower thrip. Another is the even more notorious leafminer, Liriomyza trifolii, whom every gardener knows.

Along with Rospotrebnadzor (RPN), the consumer protection agency, the RSN’s chief Sergei Dankvert (below, left) has often been accused in the foreign press of pursuing a trade protection or political agenda, on behalf of the Kremlin. The former RPN chief , Gennady Onishchenko (right), was replaced in 2013 after allegations of excessive zeal, insufficient evidence. Their targets have included cucumbers from Spain, German cheese, Egyptian potatoes, American pork, Moldovan wine, and Australian kangaroo and lamb. For the backfile, documenting that the Russians are not alone in running such alleged trade protectionist schemes, see.

Unlike the foodstuffs, cut flowers have mostly been an import to Russia, though local farm enterprises and the Kaluga region joint venture with the Dutch, Rose Garden, are growing in volume and sales at better than 20% per annum. Until now, domestic market sales are estimated to be worth at least $1 billion yearly. According to this Russian market survey for 2012-2013, more than two-thirds of sales come from imports; up to 80% of imports come from Holland. Roses originate primarily from Ecuador; chrysanthemums and carnations from Colombia; orchids from Thailand.

After sharp growth in Dutch exports to Russia of cut flowers in 2012 and 2013 – as the table shows, Russia ranked 4th largest on the Dutch cut-flower trading table – there has been a sharp contraction.

TOP-10 DESTINATIONS FOR EXPORTS OF CUT FLOWERS FROM THE NETHERLANDS (in millions of Euros)

 

Source: http://bit.ly/1SMC77x

By the end of March 2014 – that’s before the war against Russia had got under way at NATO headquarters – the Dutch export value for Russia, including bulbs and pot plants, was down 5% on the quarter; down 23% on the month. The sharpness of the decline was even greater if bulbs and potted plants are left out, and only cut flowers counted. The worm in the bud had started early in the year; the rot accelerated after the Dutch government followed Washington and London in blaming Moscow for the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 on July 17. Of the 298 crew and passengers killed, 192 were Dutch.

In 2012 FloraHolland (Koninklijke Coöperatieve Bloemenveiling, Royal Cooperative Flower Auction), the Dutch floriculture marketing organization, reported its total turnover of cut flowers, bulbs and pot plants at €4.28 billion, growing at just 3%. But growth in Russian sales was more than 40% that yearLast year, the Dutch exports to Russia had dropped substantially, and FloraHolland conceded there was “reason for concern.”

FloraHolland reports in its annual financial statements that on turnover of more than €4 billion – comprising more than 6 million lots, almost 13 million units – the market expenses run to about 9%; after-tax profit is 0.2%. For the accounts, click.

By October of 2014, analysts of the Dutch flower trade claimed the reasons for the trade reversal were the Ukraine conflict; the introduction of sanctions against Russia; and the devaluation of the rouble. This has been amplified by US Government outlets like Radio Liberty and Bloomberg. According to the radio this week, the proposed import ban “would aggravate tensions between the two countries already at odds over the downing of flight MH17”. The Dutch Federation of Agriculture and Horticulture (LTO) was more cautious, saying nothing about the export ban. But Bloomberg got the LTO spokesman, Maarten Leseman, to claim the phytosanitary violations announced by RSN in Moscow are “just an excuse for the Russian government to ban flowers. The real reason is political. The tribunal could be the real reason.”

He is referring to Dutch demands for a United Nations tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the MH17 crash. For the Dutch rush to judgement, read the backfile here. On July 16 President Vladimir Putin (left) warned Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (right), in a telephone call the latter initiated, that the Dutch and Americans were “leaking various overtly politicized versions of the events to the media”.

A closer look at the Russian cut flower trade reveals just as much disinformation. Here is an American business school study of how the Dutch work to rig the international flower market. “In a number of ways, the Dutch auction (pictured below) favors growers over buyers. First, the clocks move at high speeds, reducing buyer decision-making time and causing higher bid prices. Experiments have shown that higher speeds result in higher prices. Second, the service costs to buyers favors small lots over large lots. Thus no one party can purchase the entire lot without competition.”

The Aalsmeer flower market, world’s largest trading centre for cut flowers, near Schiphol airport, Amsterdam.

The scheme is already generating resistance among buyers, encouraging direct trade between the lowest-cost flower-producing countries and the high-value flower-consuming countries. According to the US study, “some large retailers like Marks and Spencer [UK] are bypassing the Dutch auctions and their commissions to source directly from growers in Spain and other countries.”

The Dutch acknowledge the result is a visible shift in import flows, and the elimination of the Dutch trade intermediaries. Here’s Rabo, the Dutch bank, admitting in January of this year, that African, Asian and South American countries are taking market share away from Holland:

Source: RaboBank: http://bit.ly/1SMC8IM

FloraHolland admits “the Dutch share in global flower and plant production is decreasing. Growers increasingly sell their products without the direct intervention of FloraHolland and they operate further up the chain more often than before. The importance of the auction clock decreases as the use of electronic sales resources rises. It has to be said, however, that in 2014 this took place slower than expected.”

Source: RaboBank: http://bit.ly/1IJRC0D;

The map suggests there’s no obvious geographic reason why flower shipments shouldn’t go direct to Russian ports on the Black or Baltic Sea, and why the Russian flower trade shouldn’t move upstream, investing in flower cultivation, just as the Russian banana trade did in Ecuador several years ago. For the banana story, read this. Smuggling, other corruption and bankruptcy have put a sorry end to that tale.

For the start of Russia’s affair with Ecuadorian roses, start reading in 1998, when Russian flower entrepreneurs began using Miami as their transhipment point, avoiding Amsterdam. The high cost of air freighting flowers paid off on special occasions, like Women’s Day March 8. But on an all-year round basis, the profit margin for the importers was a modest 12%. This was also the result of the large number of importers and wholesalers in the Russian market, and the intensity of competition between them. In 1998, Business Bouquet, headed by Valery Stayen, estimated that the regular companies on the market numbered 20, importing 300,000 roses per week. For special flower days on the Russian calendar, the number of importers tripled.

Today, 17 years later, Stayen and Business Bouquet are still in business. But Stayen refuses to name the top-5 or top-10 companies in the trade. He won’t answer questions either about the scope for direct trade, avoiding the Dutch market, or the impact of the proposed ban.

Talia Akhmetova, head of the press service at Florist.ru, a leading Russian internet retailer, estimates that “about 90% of all flowers sold in the country are imported. About 60% of them are imports from the EU. They not only provide almost the entire volume of the Russian market, but also the range. Holland, Italy and France, the largest producers of flowers and plants, in Europe, have a huge territory with a first-class equipment, and in addition, a suitable climate for growing flowers. All this affects the quality of the flower, which has remained unchanged throughout the year. Among the flowers imported from the EU countries there are re-exports from Colombia, Kenya, Ecuador, Israel, Turkey and other countries, but the proportion is very small, about 10% to 20%. There are also direct deliveries from South America, but this amount is not systemically significant, except for roses.”

Asked whether the Russian market can reorient its imported supplies from the other countries, she said “it is more expensive to carry flowers directly from South America, Kenya, Ecuador, etc. into Russia because the volumes will be smaller than those flowing into and out of the Dutch auctions. The cost of logistics for transportation to Russia of relatively small volumes undoubtedly affects the purchase price.”

Asked to identify the top-5 Russian importers of cut flowers, and their market shares, Akhmetova said: “unfortunately, because of the opacity of the flower market, such data cannot be identified. Accurate estimation of the volume of imports is impossible because of illegal, gray market deliveries. That is, the flowers which have not passed through certification and control at [the Dutch] flower auctions, are transported across the Russian border without documents.”

Philip de Jong, the Dutch trade representative at his embassy in Moscow, is also mute. Asked to identify the principal Russian importers and traders of Dutch cut flowers, he refused, and referred instead to the Russian Agriculture
Ministry, which has yet to respond.

Reports on the domestic industry between 2012 and 2014 by Olga Ivanova identify the top-5 importers of cut flowers as Uraltorgservice, Impulse, Exim, Baltic Gift, and Impulse-Fruit. They reportedly account for no more than 31% of the import volume. The five leading wholesalers, according to earlier data for 2012, were Obi Logistics, CFC, Moneymaker, Agricultural Services, and Uraltorgservice. They account for no more than 40% of volume. In Moscow, Obi and CFC are in the top-5; also Flower Jet, Starlight, and Imdeko. They have a combined market share of 50%. According to Ivanova, Moscow city accounts for up to 23% of Russia’s flower sales, followed by St. Petersburg and Moscow region, with 13% and 18%, respectively.

Part of the reluctance of industry sources to identify the market leaders is that their market shares are relatively small; their names keep changing; and the gray trade is sizeable. Comparing the Dutch export numbers for Russia with the corresponding Russian import numbers for the Netherlands reveals that about $30 million worth of flowers have been crossing the Russian border which haven’t been registered at origin as Russia-bound exports. That’s about 10% of the Russian import total. Industry sources estimate the value of the gray market in imported flowers as larger than that. Dutch export sources say they have no idea of the value of the gray trade, and can’t account for the $30 million discrepancy in the trade figures.

Speaking today in Moscow, Vitaly Schmalz, head of the BPF group,a leading Moscow supplier of cut flowers, plants, and bulbs, said “the ban would deprive the Dutch budget regularly of multimillion profits in euros. Without a doubt it is an adequate response to the provocative sanctions against our country.” But he added that for the small businesses engaged in the horticulture trade the import ban would be a “fiasco”. “We need at least five to seven years — if there is such a favourable factor as cheap money – to recover to the current situation.” With just 10% of the market supplied by Russian flower-growers, Schmalz said import substitution would be impossible.

Speaking from Holland for the Dutch flower traders today, Leseman expressed the hope that the ban will not be introduced. “So far there is no official decision by the Russian side, or by the EU, to suspend certification and ban Dutch flower exports.”


*NOTE: the lead image is of The Tulip Folly, a painting of 1882 by the French artist, Jean-Léon Gérôme. He was depicting the scene in 1632 when speculation on the price of tulips created a bubble the Dutch market authorities tried to let down by ordering soldiers into the tulip fields to destroy the supply. A nobleman has drawn his sword to protect his investment in an unusual potted tulip. A decade earlier, the Dutch in the islands now known as Indonesia bribed local plantation owners, attacked British merchants, and put the Balinese into slavery to keep the supply of nutmeg to themselves. At Amboyna the Dutch governor trumped up treason charges against 17 Englishmen; waterboarded them into false confessions; and chopped their heads off. The murders became a cause for the first Anglo-Dutch war, which the British won in 1654. The Dutch were then obliged to pay compensation to the families of the victims. That came to £3,615. The nutmeg story can be read in full here.

 



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Should Russia Ditch the Dutch Flower Monopoly?

Monday 27 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Conditions in Moscow Point to an Improving Economy

Marshall Horn,

I have recently returned from a week’s trip to Moscow and I will record briefly my necessarily anecdotal impressions of the economic situation.

Compared to the situation I saw in Moscow in February and March, there are clear signs of stabilisation.  

The worst of the inflation seems to be over. 

The all-too-evident beggars that were visible in February and March have disappeared. Whilst some of them may have been cleared away from the city by the police - something that undoubtedly happens in Moscow - previous experience suggests that this only has a limited effect and that in times of real hardship they quickly seep back. Their total disappearance suggests that the pressure of the inflation on people at the lower end of the income scale has abated.  

Summer is a quiet period in Moscow and one person told me that it seemed quieter than usual this year - which could suggest a continuing recession.  

However there were no obvious signs of stress on the high streets - eg. large numbers of closed or empty shops  - and none of the signs one associates with periods of severe crisis, such as I saw for example during recent visits to places like Athens and Helsinki or such as I remember from Moscow in the 1990s, eg. rowdy youths, uncollected street litter, aggressive graffiti etc. Moscow remains what it has now been for some time, a clean, orderly and graffiti free place.

I found the food shops full of produce. On the subject of the great cheese debate, Charles Bausman, the editor of Russia Insider and my generous host, offered me a range of Russian cheeses all of which were perfectly edible and some of which were excellent.

In one important respect economic activity continues at a scorching pace. Moscow is undergoing a massive make-over, with streets and sidewalks being repaired and repaved all over the city, parks laid out and improved, old buildings cleaned and restored, and new construction, especially in the suburbs, continuing at full tilt. To someone accustomed to the leisurely pace with which such things are done in Britain, the sheer pace and speed of work is exhilarating, even if it is sometimes inconvenient, with both sidewalks of a street for example being repaired at the same time, forcing pedestrians to walk with the traffic.

These of course are all anecdotal impressions. However they are consistent with the government’s latest economic projections, with the Economics Ministry now predicting a contraction of no more than 2.8% by year end, and more than 2% growth in 2016.

Is there anything that might delay or prevent this recovery? Oil prices have recently softened - a natural consequence of a glut - and they may soften further if as is now widely expected the US and British central banks raise interest rates in the next few months.  

As oil prices have softened the ruble has weakened. Unless however there is a total oil price collapse on the scale of last year’s, which few are now predicting, this is unlikely to have a significant impact.  

As Constantin Gurdgiev has pointed out there has been a steady improvement in Russia’s financial position with sovereign debt down from $57 billion last year to just $35 billion and aggregate foreign debt (both public and private) now standing at $560 billion as opposed to $730 billion a year ago. Meanwhile the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves have stabilised at $360 billion.

All this suggests a country that is methodically improving its position as it prepares itself for a period of growth. As I have written previously in light of the oil price collapse the recession is necessary to achieve a rebalancing, and that seems to be what is happening.

There is usually a lag between the picture shown by statistics and sentiment on the ground. Based on what I saw in Moscow and the government’s projections, the worst period of the recession has passed.

One important caveat must be made. As Russians constantly say, Moscow is not Russia and it may be that conditions outside Moscow are harsher.  

The point has force but can be exaggerated and Moscow is anyway so important to the Russian economy that good conditions there would tend to point to good conditions in other places.  

I am planning a trip to Perm in September, which should make it possible for me to compare the situation there.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Conditions in Moscow Point to an Improving Economy

Thursday 23 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Why Europe Will Remain Russia's Primary Gas Market

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Asia Times


Since the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the Russian media has been arguing that Russia would shift its energy exports away from Europe to the East, in particular to China.

 

There are plenty of reasons why Moscow is pushing this narrative. Over the past years, Russia’s dominant position in the European energy market has suffered several severe blows: new natural gas interconnectors, better storage facilities and new import terminals for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) have made the Eastern half of the continent less dependent on Russian energy supplies.

At the same time, the EU has initiated antitrust cases against Gazprom, supported Ukraine through the ‘reverse flow’ of gas, and, after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, imposed sanctions.

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that a frustrated Russia would be looking for less reticent customers elsewhere.

Alas, this ‘energy pivot’ is not likely to happen as advertised. While several major energy projects are currently being discussed between Russia and China, a closer look reveals that they will not constitute real alternatives but at best supplements to Russia’s European energy market.

For a number of reasons, Europe will remain Russia’s primary destination for energy exports, in particular natural gas.

China, Russia have great plans

The flagship project of the emerging energy cooperation between Russia-China, the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, would provide China with 38 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas. Yet even if the project were to deliver 61 bcm, it still pales in comparison with 146 bcm that Gazprom exported to Europe in 2014.

Moreover, the gas fields that will feed the Power of Siberia pipeline are not located in Western but Eastern Siberia, thousands of kilometres away from the fields that feed the European gas pipelines. In other words, the Eastern gas fields are too remote to be commercially viable for exports to the European market in the first place.

Finally, China is not yet prepared to pay the gas price that some European countries are paying to Gazprom. In contrast to the Power of Siberia pipeline, the projected Altai pipeline to China would be fed by the Western Siberia fields, the same that provides gas to Europe. This project originated a decade ago but remained in limbo until it was surprisingly revived last year.

However, for several reasons, neither Russia nor China appears keen to actually start implementing the project.

First, the Altai pipeline would arrive from Russia at China’s largely deserted northwest, yet it is in the industrialized southeast where the gas is really needed. This would require China to build additional pipelines across the country.

Second, Russian gas in the eastern part of China competes with supplies from Turkmenistan, which have yet to reach their full potential. This Turkmenistan-option will allow China to negotiate a Russian price that would be lower than the European price level.

A third element of the Russian ‘energy pivot’ – Russian-Chinese cooperation on oil – should not raise much concern in Europe, since oil is a globally traded commodity.

Recent statements in the Russian media that Russia had become the largest supplier of oil to China, thus overtaking Saudi Arabia, are less spectacular than they may seem: they only mean that China is importing less oil from other suppliers, who will now compete for the European market.

Other elements of the emerging Russia-China energy relationship – cooperation on LNG and the exploration of Arctic energy resources – depend largely, and paradoxically, on Russia’s cooperation with Western industry.

The development of Russia’s LNG export capability remains heavily dependent on its access to Western technologies, and the same goes for the energy exploration in the Arctic.

Before China can be the beneficiary of Russian LNG exports and tap into Arctic oil and gas resources, Russia needs Western technologies and investment, which are currently to a large extent subject to EU-US sanctions.

Even if Russia were able to access the required technologies, neither oil nor LNG produced in the Arctic would be able by themselves to solidify the Russia-China energy relationship: Both commodities can be traded on the global market, and it appears unlikely that China would limit itself to buying the rather expensive energy extracted in the Arctic without considering alternative suppliers.

In sum, Russia’s ‘energy pivot’ to China should not cause European energy consumers sleepless nights. Due to a series of infrastructure projects, European countries have increasingly more alternatives to Russian gas and oil and thus enjoy a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis Russia.

No matter how much this may frustrate Moscow, stable energy revenues from Europe remain of critical importance to the Russian state budget, particularly in the current low oil price environment.

Accordingly, Russia continues to make every effort to strengthen its energy influence in Europe, from seeking bilateral deals with European energy companies to intensive lobbying. A real ‘pivot’ looks different.

 



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Why Europe Will Remain Russia's Primary Gas Market

Wednesday 22 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Deutsche Bank on Russian 'Break-Even' Oil Prices

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at The True Economics


An interesting chart from Deutsche Bank Research putting break-even (fiscal budget) figures on oil prices for major oil producers:

image


Which puts the Russian break-even price at USD 105 per barrel.

The reality is somewhat different. Russia has the capacity to increase oil output further and has done so already (note that it is now world’s largest oil producer). It can also raise some other exports volumes, though general global conditions are not exactly supportive of this, and this underpins the revenue side of the budgetary balance somewhat.

Meanwhile, the Russian government’s own budgetary estimates put the break-even price of crude at around USD 80-85 per barrel, not USD 105 per barrel, which puts it closer to the UAE than to Oman.

Also, the Russian budget is listed in rubles, not USD. This means that the FX valuation of the Ruble to a basket of currencies (Russian exports are not all priced in USD) co-determines the break-even price. Moderating (albeit still very high) inflation and EUR trend, compared to USD trend, suggest a falling ‘fiscal break-even’ price of oil for Russia.

There are too many variables to attempt to estimate an effective and accurate ‘break-even’ price for oil for Russia.

What is clear however is that Russia’s current account (external balance) is in the black and is improving, not deteriorating. The latest balance of payments data show a current account surplus of almost USD 20 billion in 2Q15. The June 2015 y/y current account surplus is at 4% of GDP. The driver here is a decline in imports (down 40% in dollar terms in 2Q15 y/y) outpacing a drop in exports (down just under 30% y/y). In the first half of 2015 the trade surplus was USD 70 billion (USD 210 billion in exports, USD 140 billion in imports).

The balance of payments is also being supported on the upside by a decline in capital outflows. 2Q15 capital outflows amounted to ca USD 20 billion, predominantly comprising bank repayments of maturing foreign debt (which improves bank balance sheets and deleverages the economy). Moreover, direct investment from abroad into Russian non-fianncial corporations rose over 2Q15, resulting in an increase in foreign debt held by the non-financial sector.

Overall, the Russian Central Bank shows a foreign debt position at ca USD 560 billion (or 30% of GDP) at the end of 2Q15 - basically unchanged from 1Q15 and down from USD 730 billion at the end of 2Q14.

And another reminder to fiscalistas:
 

  • Russian public (government) external debt currently stands at USD35 billion. 
  • State-controlled banks hold USD 90 billion in external debt (total banking sector external debt is USD 150 billion and 60% of that is held by state-owned banks).
  • State-controlled NFC firms hold ca 40% of USD 360 billion foreign debt written against Russian NFCs (USD 144 billion). 
  • Accounting for cross-holdings and direct equity-linked debt, net foreign debt that has to be repaid at maturity or refinanced by NFCs and Banks owned by the Russian Government is probably around USD 150-160 billion. 


Sizeable, but less than 12% of GDP even after including the official public debt and state-owned enterprises debts.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Deutsche Bank on Russian 'Break-Even' Oil Prices

Friday 17 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Russia Has Embraced the Weaker Ruble

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Business New Europe


It is axiomatic that every major sporting event has a distinctive theme tune and every financial crisis has at least one unique descriptive slogan or buzzword. In Russia today the competition for that catchphrase is between “localisation” and “the new norm”.

A great deal has already been written about localisation, aka “import substitution”, but what exactly does “new norm” mean and how may it affect businesses and investment returns in the future? 

The one point we can be sure of is that it will not involve a return to the old macro or growth model. Between 2000 and 2012 the Russian growth model was founded on an almost unprecedented consumer boom, which was fuelled by $3 trillion of trickle down oil and gas tax revenues and the start of the credit industry.

That led to a dozen years of strong double-digit growth in the retail and other consumer sectors which, in turn, was the main driver of headline GDP growth.

That phase is now over and while the consumer and retail sectors are still capable of growing at rates above those of developed economies, the sector has matured relative to the end of the nineties and is no longer capable of driving strong headline growth alone.

Russia needs a new growth driver and that has to be based on a big and sustainable increase in investment spending.

This is something that President Putin acknowledged publicly for the first time in his annual Federal Assembly Address in December 2013.

Recall that growth in 2013 slipped to only 1.3%, from almost 4.5% two years earlier, and that despite oil averaging $110 per barrel and against a backdrop of global recovery. The message about the need for change could not have been clearer.

So, if we know that Russia cannot return to the old macro model, what new conditions can be created which will constitute the new norm?

It is fair to say that this is work in progress and while some revised policy priorities have become clear, there is still a lot more which is still unclear. Russia is at a crossroads and must decide on which road to take.

This is unlike the 2009 recession when it was okay to simply sit it out and wait for the oil price to recover. This is one of those times when it really is different.

Of course the Kremlin could make the conscious decision to try to pursue a muddle-through strategy, i.e. a sort of cross your fingers, hope for the best and keep telling people that it will be fine tomorrow. That’s a sort of Brezhnev option and would more likely lead to borderline stagnation and poor investment returns.

Eventually a long period of poor economic performance could create conditions for a colour revolution. It seems that many in the Kremlin are aware of this, and fear it, so that a do nothing option is most unlikely.

Those with a Russia phobia warn of a turn towards increased nationalism and isolationism, i.e. a sort of blame the West option as a possible distraction strategy.

There is zero evidence that this is a plausible option being considered.

On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence from the past 18 months which shows that despite the tough geopolitical rhetoric and threats, in the end the Kremlin has been careful not to push away Western companies and has been trying to limit the damage to longer-term recovery prospects. In any event a colour revolution would surely come much sooner down that particular road.

Instead the evidence suggests that Putin’s government is more interested in changing the model and creating conditions that can lead to a higher level of growth over the longer-term.

Certainly for now the priority is maintaining stability and riding out the financial storm and almost all of the resources available to the government are being set aside to ensure that remains the case.

Only when banks and industrial companies are again able to access international debt markets may we see a clear shift from planning and optimistic government rhetoric to specific actions.

180-degree change

But one part of the long-term recovery strategy has already been put into effect and that is the 180-degree change in the ruble policy. Ever since the 1998 default and ruble collapse the government has prioritised a strong and stable ruble policy.

There were several good reasons for that. The first being that the country was performing very nicely on the back of rising hydrocarbon wealth and had little need to create diversification or to boost such sectors as manufacturing.

Russia could afford to import what it needed and people were very happy to spend the strong ruble on foreign holidays.

The second reason was because of the legacy of the 1990s during which there were several currency and bank crises. To some extent the ruble had become the bellwether of overall wellbeing in the country and so long as the ruble was stable and the state banks expanding there was no reason to worry about much else.

The third reason, which was especially evident in 2008 and 2009, was because so many of Russia’s industrial companies and banks had borrowed so much in low interest bearing foreign currencies on the assumption that there was no exchange rate risk.

The 2008 oil price collapse forced the Central Bank to burn through around $200bn of its reserves to try to defend the ruble while Russian companies scrambled to convert their external loans into ruble debt. That situation has also changed completely and the risk mis-match is much less dangerous today.

Over the past six months the policy started to change. First there was no public panic when the ruble collapsed in December. For sure there were queues at ATMs but only to extract cash in order to buy durable goods that could have become scarce or more expensive in the months ahead. People no longer equated a ruble collapse with a broader economic threat in the same way they used to a decade or more earlier.

The key message that a weaker ruble is better than a strong ruble started to be better understood when the first quarter macro report showed a significant gain in some parts of domestic manufacturing as a result of the competitiveness boost from the ruble weakness in late 2014.

Suddenly people were looking for cheaper domestic alternatives. We also now hear government officials linking the more “competitive” currency with the import-substitution strategy. The same can be said for the plan to try to boost exports in sectors outside of extractive industries. “Competitive Russia” may also become one of those slogans to be associated with this crisis.  

The other epiphany we hear, and have seen in action, is the understanding that it actually matters much less where the oil price trades so long as the ruble is allowed to be flexible to compensate.

This is one of the reasons cited by the finance minister for his concern about the strong ruble recovery in the three months to early May. He can more easily balance the budget with a weaker or flexible ruble.

It is early days yet and we should not expect any major new initiatives from the government until there is more confidence about financial sector sanctions ending and, perhaps, until the election process is completed. But what we do know with certainty is that the economy has survived the crisis and will pull out of recession in Q4 this year or early in 2016.

But just surviving is not good enough beyond the short term and, thankfully, it seems those with the power to make changes seem to understand that.

There needs to be many changes in the years ahead, not least of which is the need to improve the business climate and boost competitiveness. But the shift in the ruble policy shows there is an underlying pragmatism. For businesses and investors looking past the current crisis that alone should offer a reason for optimism. 



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Russia Has Embraced the Weaker Ruble

Marshall Horn - Russia Says No to GMO Seeds; Aims for Food Supply That's 'Cleanest in the World'

Marshall Horn,

July 15 (NaturalNews) - The future of agriculture in Russia won’t involve genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), says the country’s Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich. In order to preserve the quality and integrity of its food supply, Russia plans to stick with growing methods that protect the soil and boost yields naturally, a move that Dvorkovich says will make his country’s food among the “cleanest in the world.”

Russia does not import GMOs like most of Europe currently does, nor does it grow them. Unlike the U.S., Russia has deep concerns about the safety of GMOs and has chosen to implement an extended moratorium on their use as it looks to other, safer technologies that don’t come with the risk of birth defects, endocrine disruption and cancer.

At the recent International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, Dvorkovich told listeners that Russia has “chosen a different path,” and that the country “will not use these [GM] technologies” to boost agricultural production. The announcement coincides with statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin back in 2014 about the need to “protect” Russian citizens against GMOs.

“We need to properly construct our work so that it is not contrary to our obligations under the WTO [World Trade Organization],” Putin stated.

“But even with this in mind, we nevertheless have legitimate methods and instruments to protect our own market, and above all citizens.”

Russian official: GMOs cause obesity and cancer and won’t be tolerated

This is the type of thing Americans should be demanding from their own elected leaders – an emphasis on protecting people rather than corporate profits – but, alas, the United States looks at GMOs much differently. Regardless of all the safety risks involved, America’s political puppets believe that GMOs should continue to dominate the national food market without even being labeled.

Meanwhile, Russia is leading the way in ridding its land of toxic poisons, stressing the need for agricultural policies that take a precautionary approach to controversial modalities like biotechnology that involve artificial gene splicing and toxic pesticides. The Vice President of Russia’s National Association for Genetic Safety, Irina Ermakova, had this to say recently about the issue:

“It has been proven that not only in Russia, but also in many other countries in the world, GMOs are dangerous.

Consumption and use of GMOs obtained in such way can lead to tumors, cancers and obesity among animals.”

Prime Minister: If Americans want GMOs, fine, but Russians prefer organic

Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev also made global headlines last year when he announced that Russia would no longer import any GMO products, boldly proclaiming that Russia has more than enough land and resources to produce organic food safely and cleanly without the need for corporate-owned, bio-pirated GMOs seeds and their corresponding growth chemicals.

He stated, as quoted by RT.com, “If the Americans like to eat GMO products, let them eat it then. We don’t need to do that; we have enough space and opportunities to produce organic food.”

With all this in mind, the American media’s “Russia is evil” ruse becomes increasingly less convincing.

Americans would be hard-pressed to ever have a politician stand up against GMOs like Russia’s leaders have, and yet they’re the “bad guys” and we’re the “good guys”?

Perhaps it’s time for more Americans to reevaluate who’s really calling the shots in the “land of the free” and what their motivation might be to vilify a country that has chosen to reject bio-piracy and uphold true, free-market agriculture in the interest of public health and national sovereignty.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Russia Says No to GMO Seeds; Aims for Food Supply That's 'Cleanest in the World'

Marshall Horn - Russia Mulls a Bid for Greek Railways and Thessaloniki Port in EU-Mandated Fire Sale

Marshall Horn,

MOSCOW, July 13 (Sputnik) —The Russian side is ready to participate in the privatization of Greek enterprises, a range of Russian companies are willing to invest in industrial and infrastructure projects in Greece, a source in the Russian government told RIA Novosti Monday.

The source said that Russia’s largest railway company, Russian Railways, had stated earlier its interest in the acquisition of the three Greek assets — Thessaloniki ports, as well as the TrainOSE and ROSCO railway companies.

“A number of other Russian companies are also interested in investing in Greece, particularly in certain industrial and infrastructure facilities,” the source added.

 



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Russia Mulls a Bid for Greek Railways and Thessaloniki Port in EU-Mandated Fire Sale

Thursday 16 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Legendary Investor Jim Rogers: Ruble a Better Currency Than Dollar

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Sputnik 


American investor Jim Rogers has actively encouraged investing into Russia. During his interview with Gazeta.ru Rogers said that he has joined the Board of Directors and bought shares of ‘PhosAgro’ which is a Russian chemical holding company producing fertilizer, phosphates and feed phosphates.

He also increased the proportion of shares of the Moscow Stock Exchange and he also has a paper of ‘Aeroflot’.

Concerning the current rouble situation Rogers said, “Russia has low debt, unlike Greece, as well as convertible currency, which is quite unique for the new markets. So fundamentally its position can be called normal. It is being pressured by lower oil prices, but as soon as the black gold finds the stable point the situation will improve for the rouble.”

He also mentioned the dollar saying that the US currency is in a terrible situation as the US national debt and trade deficit are huge.

“If we simply write out on paper the facts that lie behind the ruble and the dollar, without naming the currency, then everyone will want to buy rubles and no one will buy dollars. But as soon as you name them then, of course, people buy dollars.”

He added that he hopes he will be smart enough to get rid of dollars before the collapse happens. “Everything seems perfect, until one day it ceases to be so. It was the same with Britain, France, Spain and Greece. Often stocks manage to go up for a few years before hitting bankruptcy.”

It is a matter of time before Asia becomes a major partner for Russia. For America this would mean that they will not receive their share of potential in the Asian market. The “US has simply shot itself in the foot.”

“The Asian market is much larger — 3 billion people. The population of the United States and Europe is a little more than 1 billion people. For Russia it is better to be with 3 billion creditors than 1 billion debtors,” the investor explained.

Jim Rogers said that China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are where all the money is, while the US and Europe have become the largest debtors.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Legendary Investor Jim Rogers: Ruble a Better Currency Than Dollar

Marshall Horn - US Currency Losing Status as Countries Opt-out of Dollar Trade

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Visual Capitalist. Infographic from Sputnik


The dollar has been a stalwart of international trade over the majority of the last century. Around the time of the formation of the Eurozone, it reached its recent peak at 71.0% of official foreign exchange reserves. Since then, its composition of global reserves has more recently dropped to a more modest 62.9% in 2014.

However, the dollar is slowly losing its status as the world’s undisputed reserve currency. This is not an unusual event as far as history goes.

In fact, about every century or so since the Renaissance, the global reserve currency has shifted. Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, France, and Britain have had dominant currencies at different times.

Today’s infographic (below) shows that the wind is shifting in international trade.With less countries and organizations using the dollar to settle international transactions, it slowly chips away at its hegemony of the dollar. China is at the epicenter and the country is making continued progress in cutting deals outside of the U.S. dollar framework.

Deals shown in the graphic are currency flows between countries that have abandoned the dollar in bilateral trade, as well as countries that are considering such measures.

Link to picture

The most recent culmination of these trends is the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a China-led rival to the World Bank and IMF that includes 57 founding countries and $100 billion of capital. The United States is not a member and has actively lobbied its allies to avoid joining due to perceived governance issues.

Other recent deals by China include: a 30-year $400 billion energy alliance with Russia, a second energy deal focusing on natural gas worth $284 billion with Russia, and a deal removing tariffs on 85% of Australian commodity exports to China. Further, China and Russia have agreed to pay each other in domestic currencies in order to bypass the U.S. dollar.

It is not only the Chinese that are starting to question the viability of the dollar. A report in 2010 by the United Nations called for the abandonment of the U.S. dollar as the single reserve currency. The Gulf Cooperation Council has also expressed desires for an independent reserve currency.

In the short term, especially with a crashing Chinese stock market and fledgling Eurozone, the dollar will likely reign supreme. It’s still a stretch for the yuan to make its way into foreign reserve coffers so long as capital controls remain in place and the country’s bond market is not open or transparent to offshore investors. However, Beijing is currently mulling ways to internationalize the yuan, and each step it takes will take China closer to challenging dollar hegemony.

With more bilateral trade transactions bypassing the dollar, and the increasing internationalization of the Chinese financial system, the yuan is eventually going to give the dollar a run for its money.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC US Currency Losing Status as Countries Opt-out of Dollar Trade

Wednesday 15 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Fabio Capello, Manager of Russia National Football Team Leaves With $16 Million Pay-Off

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Inside World Football


July 14 – Russian preparations for the 2018 World Cup may be progressing smoothly when it comes to building stadia and planning transport infrastructure, but dissatisfaction with the national team’s progress under coach Fabio Capello has resulted in his contract being terminated three years before the finals. 

Capello’s future had been in discussion with the Russian Football Union since June of last year, which was the start of a six month period in which he went unpaid. Most of his backroom staff, who also had wages outstanding, had departed Russia months before the final decision to terminate Capello’s contract.

Nikita Simonyan, the RFU’s acting president, said that all outstanding money owed to Capello until the end of the 2014-15 season had been paid. R-Sport has put the level of the compensation at 930 million rubles ($16.34 million).

The RFU had been struggling for finance in the face of a lack of high paying sponsors. Capello’s contract was out of sync with the RFU’s economic situation, especially as his salary was negotiated and paid in euros at a time when the rouble was dropping in value, effectively almost doubling his cost to the federation.

But it was the Russian team performances that ultimately sealed his fate.

Capello took over the Russian team in 2012 and lead them to the Brazil 2014 World Cup following an impressive unbeaten qualifying campaign. But the Brazil tournament was a disappointment, with Russia being eliminated in the group stages.

With qualification for Euro2016 now looking more difficult following a surprise loss to Austria and just eight points won from six games, Russia will likely have to face a qualifying play off to reach the finals. The calls for Capello’s sacking were even being heard in the Russian Duma.

Russia is expecting a strong home team performance in 2018, but now looks to be running out of time to prepare a world beating squad, Euro2016 would be a crucial measure of the team’s progress.

The Executive Committee of the RFU has just passed a ‘6+5’ limit on the foreign players allowed to play in Russian football clubs – a rule believed vital to give Russian players experience at the top level. Previously the rule was for 10 foreign players and 15 Russians in a Superleague squad and ‘7+4’ players on the pitch (no more than seven foreign players on the pitch at any one time).

But the new rule may be too late to have any real effect on the national team by the World Cup in 2018.

No successor to Capello has been named but the RFU is expected to choose a Russian national as its next manager with CSKA Moscow coach Leonid Slutski being the current favourite for the job.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Fabio Capello, Manager of Russia National Football Team Leaves With $16 Million Pay-Off

Marshall Horn - Moscow Beats Paris as Europe's Largest Shopping Center Market

Marshall Horn,

 

This article originally appeared at Russia Beyond the Headlines

 


Moscow has overtaken Paris to become the European capital with the most shopping center space, even as a recession forces Russians to cut back on consumer spending.

In the first half of this year Moscow had more than 4.53 million square meters of shopping center retail space, compared with 4.5 million square meters in Paris, according to a report by real estate consultancy Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL).

But the boom in Moscow mall building will be followed by a slump as Russia’s economic downturn catches up with the sector, experts told The Moscow Times. The new economic reality will also likely end a trend of building massive mega-malls in Moscow and spur the growth of smaller shopping centers that are cheaper to build and run, they said.

Large malls have hogged investors’ attention for long enough, according to Olesya Dzyuba, head of research at real estate firm Colliers International Russia.

“Small format shopping malls have great potential on the Moscow market since there are not enough of them,” she said.

Record volumes

Six shopping centers have already opened in Moscow this year with a total area of 343,000 square meters, according to data from Colliers International. 
“It’s an absolute record,” Dzyuba said.

But the new space is coming online just as an economic crisis is hitting Russians’ spending power. Russia’s economy is expected to shrink by around 3 percent this year under pressure from sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union over the Ukraine crisis and the fallen price of oil, Russia’s main export. With incomes falling sharply, Russians spent 7.7 percent less on consumer purchases in the first five months of this year than in the same period in 2014, according to official data from the Rosstat statistics service.

The mega-malls now opening in Moscow were begun long before the current crisis, when retailers were confident of economic growth and were developing rapidly.

But the recession is causing a shift in attitudes that will temper enthusiasm for new mall projects, said Nikolai Kazansky, managing partner of Colliers International Russia.

“Since consumer demand isn’t growing, retailers are no longer enthusiastic about developing their chains in Russia,” he said.

Vacancy rates in new shopping malls are now around 6-8 percent, compared with 3 percent before the crisis, according to estimates by JLL. Many malls have slashed rent rates, some by up to 50 percent, to keep retailers.

According to Denis Sokolov, head of research at real estate firm Cushman & Wakefield Russia, only one or two new shopping malls will open next year.

Colliers International is more optimistic, predicting that 500,000 square meters of new retail space will come online in 2016 — the same as this year — but that 2017 will see a sharp slowdown.

According to JLL data, investment in Moscow retail real estate amounted to $2.2 billion in 2013, of which about 60 percent was foreign capital. Last year, only $350 million was invested, all from Russian sources.

Changing format

The economic crisis will reduce not only the number of new shopping centers in Moscow in the near future, but also their size.

Despite being a popular European trend, small format shopping centers are not common in Russia.

With fast economic growth producing huge rises in annual consumer spending, the last decade saw developers build massive shopping centers with an area of 100,000 square meters or more to quickly supply retail space to the market.

Capping that trend, Moscow’s mega-mall Avia Park, which opened last year at 228,500 square meters, became Europe’s biggest shopping center.

But with Russia’s economy predicted to emerge slowly from the current crisis, the logic will change.

Smaller shopping centers that are closer to residential areas will be easier to fill than huge malls, said Tatyana Kluchinskaya, head of the retail department at real estate consultancy Jones Lang LaSalle Russia.

Cushman & Wakefield’s Sokolov added that developers will find it harder to raise financing during the crisis for large shopping centers, which on average require about $500 million.

While Moscow now has Europe’s biggest stock of shopping center retail space, the market still has great growth potential. At more than 12 million people, Moscow has an official population five times larger than that of Paris, which has around 2.25 million residents within its city limits.

“In Moscow we have 434 square meters of shopping centre space per 1,000 residents. In big European cities the volume of shopping center retail space per 1,000 residents is 600-700 meters,” Dzyuba said.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Moscow Beats Paris as Europe's Largest Shopping Center Market

Tuesday 14 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Crimea to Get a Badly Needed Second Airport

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at The Moscow Times


Crimea will get a second commercial airport in 2016 as Russia seeks to improve transport links with the peninsula, which Moscow annexed from Ukraine last year, news agency TASS reported Monday, citing local government officials.

The Russian government has promoted travel to Crimea, whose economy relies on tourism. But Russians can only reach the peninsula by air or over-scheduled ferry from mainland Russia.

The Sevastopol government has estimated that the Belbek airport will be able to take half a million passengers annually from numerous Russian cities following renovations, which it expects to cost 1.5 billion rubles ($27 million), according to TASS.

Read more in The Moscow Times



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Crimea to Get a Badly Needed Second Airport

Saturday 11 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Why the Oil Glut will Continue and How it Benefits Russia

Marshall Horn,

According to the International Energy Agency (“IEA”) the oil supply glut is set to continue until well into 2016.

Inevitably there will be some people who will say that the IEA is deliberately talking down the market so as to encourage a low oil price, which is presumed to be beneficial for Western economies.

What the IEA is predicting however follows the classic pattern of an over-supply glut.

The initial response of producers to a supply glut is to increase rather than cut back production as a way of keeping market share and maintaining cash flow through higher sales.  Heavily indebted marginal producers like the shale producers in the US tend to do this to an even greater degree than more established producers, since they have to maintain cash flow to pay their debts.

The result is that as production grows the supply glut increases driving prices down even more.

This is the process the IEA is describing and given the state of the market and the debt financing needs of US shale producers - the weakest link in the industry - it makes complete sense.

Oil is by no means unique in following this pattern.  One of the reasons for the “dust bowls” in the US in the 1930s was the removal of top soils by US farmers driven to overproduce in the 1920s by low prices caused by the conditions of over supply created by the  preceding period of high prices before and during the First World War.

Falling prices during the supply glut caused by rising production however eventually undermine the position of marginal producers, especially if as US farmers were in the 1920s and as some US shale producers are today, they are heavily indebted. 

In the 1930s in the US farm industry there was actually a foreclosure crisis.  It is not completely impossible that something similar may eventually happen amongst weaker producers in the US shale industry.

Once the process has finally run its course prices will recover - probably by more than some assume.

The last few months have shown that Russia is capable of weathering the oil price fall.  Indeed a period of lower oil prices is arguably beneficial to an economy with low debt that wants to expand its agricultural and manufacturing base.  Used properly a period of low oil prices should encourage higher investment in agriculture and manufacturing as opposed to energy, which has had a disproportionate share of investment up to now.

For this period of lower oil prices to be used properly, so that long-term investment in manufacturing and industry become truly profitable, inflation and interest rates need to fall below what have been their historic levels in Russia, which is why the government is so single-mindedly focused on lowering inflation.

———————————————

From the Financial Times

The rebalancing of the oil market that started last year has yet to run its course and a bottom in prices “may still be ahead”, according to the world’s leading energy forecaster.

In a bearish assessment of market conditions the International Energy Agency said the adjustment process would “extend well into 2016” as production — led by Opec nations — continued to swell and demand growth softened.

The Paris-based agency, which advises the world’s biggest economies on energy policy, said the oil market was “massively oversupplied”.

Global oil supply surged by 550,000 barrels a day in June to 96.6m b/d, up 3.1m b/d from the same month a year ago, the IEA said in a widely followed monthly report

“The market’s ability to absorb that oversupply is unlikely to last. Onshore storage space is limited. So is the tanker fleet. New refineries do not get built every day,” the IEA said. “Something has to give.”

That something could be US shale oil, the agency said. Relentless supply growth from North America has been one of the factors contributing to the glut in crude oil.

While some weakness in US shale oil output was beginning to show “it may also take another price drop for the full supply response to unfold”, the IEA warned.

Oil prices on both sides of the Atlantic fell sharply this week, with Brent crude — the international benchmark — entering bear market territory. Brent hit $55 a barrel on Monday, rattled by the financial turmoil in Greece and the stock market rout in China. On Friday Brent had risen back to $59 a barrel — a level that is still almost 50 per cent lower than last year’s $115 a barrel June peak.

Cost savings, efficiency gains and hedging have helped shale producers “defy expectations” until now, but supply growth ground to a halt in May and is forecast to stay at these levels through mid-2016, the IEA noted. After growing at 1.7m b/d in 2014, US shale onshore production is forecast to slow to 900,000 b/d this year and 300,000 b/d in 2016.

As a whole, the IEA expects non-Opec supply growth will slow to 1m b/d in 2015 and stay flat in 2016 as lower oil prices and spending cuts take hold.

Although the IEA increased its global demand growth forecast for 2016 to 1.2m b/d — taking total demand to 95.2m b/d — it is still less than 1.4m b/d it predicts for this year.

 

“World oil demand growth appears to have peaked in the first quarter of 2015 at 1.8m barrels a day and will continue to ease throughout the rest of this year and into next,” said the IEA.

A possible Greek exit from the eurozone could suppress demand across the continent if economic activity was to weaken, the IEA said.

The agency said that would not translate into a “tighter market” for oil in 2016 as long as members of Opec, the oil producing cartel, continued to pump at near record levels.

“The group is not slowing down. On the contrary, its core Middle East producers are pumping at record rates and the outlook for Iraqi capacity growth — accounting for most projected Opec expansions — keeps improving,” it said.

Opec crude supply reached a three-year high in June to 31.7m b/d, up 340,000 b/d from the prior month, led by Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The IEA estimates that the demand for the cartel’s crude will stand at 30.3m b/d next year, up 1m b/d from 2015. But this is still a “whopping” 1.4m b/d less than its current production.

An Iranian nuclear deal with world powers could also unleash more barrels on to the market.

 

 

 



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Why the Oil Glut will Continue and How it Benefits Russia

Marshall Horn - Why Russia's Gas Pipeline Deal With Greece Is Likely to Be Stillborn

Marshall Horn,

After prolonged discussion and some agonising, Greece has now confirmed that it has a preliminary agreement with Gazprom to build a gas pipeline across Greece from the hub in Turkey.

This agreement bears only a pale resemblance to the proposal that was discussed in Moscow and Athens in March and April.  Most importantly it does not come with a pre-payment.

Greece will not therefore see any financial benefit from this pipeline until 2019 and - unlike the proposals discussed in March and April - what has now been signed can in no way be considered part of a larger bailout package of Greece involving Russia and the other BRICS states (see What Russia Offered Greece, Russia Insider, 25th June 2015).

With Greece in default to the IMF, capital controls imposed on the country and Greece’s banks in only partial operation, there is anyway simply no time now for the sort of financial package involving the BRICS Bank the Russians were talking about in March and April.  Not surprisingly therefore, in recent days the Russian Finance Ministry has moved to downplay that option. 

The underlying story of the Greek crisis is that though there were some elements within the Greek government - notably the Energy Ministry - that were keen on a realignment with Russia and the BRICS, the predominant faction in the Greek government, including at all times the Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and both the outgoing and the incoming Finance Ministers, Varoufakis and Tsakalotos, always thought in the end solely in terms of a deal with the EU. 

It is doubtful in fact that this pipeline will ever be built.  

Despite some claims to the contrary, the political will to build the pipeline to Turkey is certainly there on both sides, and there is no doubt it will be built.

By contrast the will to build the pipeline in Greece does not seem to be there.  At the moment it looks very much like the pet project of the Energy Minister, Panagiotis Lafazanis, rather than something the entire Greek government is signed up to. 

Given the implacable opposition to the project of the US and the EU, that all but guarantees its failure.

 

 

 

 

 



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Why Russia's Gas Pipeline Deal With Greece Is Likely to Be Stillborn

Friday 10 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Now Even Kudrin Says It - Russia's Economy will Resume Growth in Final Quarter

Marshall Horn,

Aleksey Kudrin, Russia’s former Finance Minister and one of the most pessimistic voices in Russia on the state of the economy, has now said that he too expects signs of recovery to become apparent in the last quarter of 2015.

This brings Kudrin into line with the forecasts of the Finance and Economics Ministries and of the Central Bank.

Meanwhile inflation is continuing to fall.  It is now estimated to be running at an annualised rate of 15.2%, with the Economics Ministry predicting deflation (ie. falling prices) in August.

Meanwhile the Finance Ministry is predicting a total budget deficit for 2015 of just 3% of GDP, the Central Bank’s reserves grew by $4.8 billion in June and the ruble seems to have shrugged off the brief plunge in oil prices that took place because of the Greek crisis.

Against this Andrey Kostin, Chairman of VTB, Russia’s second biggest bank, has said that he expects the next cut in interest rates to be no more than 50 basis points.  This comes despite the ruble’s stabilisation, the fall in inflation and a significant fall in investment and manufacturing output in the period March to June caused in large part by the high interest rates.

Concerning interest rates, in conditions of falling prices such as are now forecast for August, the real burden of interest rates is actually growing despite the nominal decline since the start of the year.  This tends to reinforce the impression that the Russian authorities and the Central Bank have made a conscious decision to trade a short but relatively shallow recession for a long term reduction in inflation.

As to the severity of the recession, it has resulted in a significant cut in real incomes - the first since Putin came to power - but no steep rise in the rate of unemployment, which remains low.

Given the growing consensus of a return to growth in the fourth quarter, it would now be something of a surprise if that didn’t happen.  There are in fact no obvious reasons why it should not.

Overall the Russian economy has responded well to last year’s collapse in oil prices.  The adjustment has been surprisingly fast and far less painful than was anticipated.

Further confirmation that Obama’s claims that Russia doesn’t make anything and that Putin is wrecking Russia’s economy by trying to restore the USSR are nonsense.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Now Even Kudrin Says It - Russia's Economy will Resume Growth in Final Quarter

Thursday 9 July 2015

Marshall Horn - Russia to Supply 100 Sukhoi Passenger Jets to China

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Russia Beyond the Headlines


Russia will supply 100 Sukhoi Superjets to China in the next three years, Russian Trade and Industry Minister Denis Manturov said at the Innprom-2015 Defense Exhibition in Yekaterinburg.

The first five airplanes will be delivered in 2016.

According to Manturov, Russia and China will also jointly manufacture a large passenger airplane and a heavy helicopter.

“Industrial cooperation within the framework of APEC, ASEAN and BRICS is particularly important in times of political instability,” Manturov said. “We have agreed to hold a meeting in October in Moscow between the main ministries of the BRICS nations.”

Bilateral trade between Russia and China touched $90 billion last year, Manturov said, adding that Russia would like this figure to touch $200 billion by 2020. “The share of the oil and gas sector in Russia’s exports is obviously very high, but the non-raw material industries accounted for $50 billion (in trade with China) and we must try to increase it in the future,” he said.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Russia to Supply 100 Sukhoi Passenger Jets to China

Marshall Horn - Do Russia Sanctions Still Exist?

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at OilPrice.com


In a previous article on Oilprice, I questioned whether western sanctions imposed on Russia were being regularly breached by E.U. and Asian companies, noting that sanctions only work if all countries unite behind them.

In June, the Financial Times reported that only one year after being imposed, the sanctions are eroding. It seems that government and business policies are pulling in opposite directions, despite the sanction regime being clear on the activities that are banned, as explained by Forbes:

“Last July (‘14), the E.U. banned its companies from signing any new financing deals with Russia. In September, the E.U. placed even more restrictions on Russia’s access to E.U. capital markets. The sanctions state that individuals and corporations from the E.U. are banned from providing loans to five major Russian state-owned banks, including Sberbank and VTB Bank, and the three state owned energy companies, of which Gazprom tops the list.

The September sanctions, which went into effect on the 12th of that month, said that companies could no longer provide services related to the issuing of financial instruments, including broker relationships.

In addition, certain services necessary for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration or production and shale oil projects in Russia were also banned.”

Much of the mainstream financial news also began picking up on the ‘sanction-busting’ story, pointing out that many NATO tied governments did not regard Russian sanctions as an obstacle to doing business with Russian energy companies.

Forbes notes that, as a result of sanctions, western oil companies that were once dominant in Russia are now being replaced by European and Asian companies. The article stated that ExxonMobil was “kicked out of Russia” because of sanctions, and was forced to cap a major Arctic discovery in the Kara Sea, where it had spent some 3/4 of a billion dollars, as part of a joint venture with Rosneft. 

ExxonMobil has 10 joint ventures in Russia with the state-owned firm Rosneft, but all of those have been shelved due to the sanctions.

European Union (EU) business and political leaders tend to question the validity of sanctions more than those in U.S., because sanctions have a much greater negative economic impact in the Europe. On the question of energy policy and Russia, clear differences are emerging within the EU, as well as between the EU and U.S.

One example of these differences arose over Iran sanctions, where the EU has recently voted to prolong its suspension of sanctions, until nuclear negotiations are completed.

“European companies are finding ways and are certainly freer to do business than their U.S. counterparts,” James Henderson, senior fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, told the Financial Times. “U.S. companies are going to be hugely disadvantaged as we go forward because E.U. sanctions are not retroactive and U.S. ones are.”

It remains an open question as to whether China and India’s multibillion dollar loans to Russia and their current joint energy ventures with Rosneft were a direct circumvention of western sanctions, with both Rosneft and its Chairman sanctioned. That also raises questions as to whether the sanctions themselves are creating unfair trade advantages for ‘busters.’

These potentially sanction busting deals were announced at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum:

• BP buys 20% of Rosneft-owned oil reserves in E.Siberia, in a $700 million deal, creating new Asian-bound oil partnership 
• Rosneft and Indian state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp signed long-term deals. 
• Gazprom and Royal Dutch Shell are building a global alliance
• Gazprom signed an agreement with the Greek government to pursue its Turkish Stream Pipeline 
• Gazprom signed a 300 million euro loan with Unicredit Bank of Austria
• Gazprom held discussions with Engie (formerly GDF Suez) over gas pipelines to France

The capper came at the St Petersburg Economic Forum, where the Saudis arrived, offering to be a full-fledged finance partner in Russia’s energy development, in exchange for Russian nuclear expertise and military arms. Two weeks later, the Saudis raised the bet with a five-year, $10 billion investment in Russia’s agriculture, retail, and real estate sectors.

It is one thing to see Russia replace the West with China as client, partner, and financier of energy development; it’s quite another to see Russia swap western finance for Middle Eastern finance, sourced from one of the West’s strongest allies. That is likely to cause major concerns in western banking circles.

For the investment community, there was another sign at the Forum of the way the investment wind may be blowing. Jim Rogers, an American multi-billionaire investor and former partner of George Soros’s Quantum Fund, announced that he was investing in Russian assets precisely because “…they are the most hated in the world.”

The famous American contrarian has recently accepted a Board of Director’s Seat at PhosAgro, a Russian fertilizer company, where he is also a major stakeholder.

Some six months after sanctions were imposed, the U.S. Secretary of State visited the Kremlin for private talks with Putin, which were widely interpreted as an attempt to ease international tensions over Ukraine. After the St. Petersburg Forum, the first telephone conversation between Presidents Obama and Putin took place, breaking an eighteen month silence.

As tensions ease, and the news becomes more focused on issues like Greece, rather than Ukraine, sanctions vigilance seems to be eroding. There are also signs emerging that some U.S. analysts are beginning to question the western narrative on Russia’s actions in Ukraine. One example comes from a senior analyst at Stratfor.com, one of the most widely respected U.S. strategic intelligence newsletters. Senior Analyst Lauren Goodrich argued in a June 29 video on Stratfor’s website that the U.S. is actually the one making antagonizing moves while Russia is merely responding:

“The way that the American media has put it out there is that Russia is being the aggressor (in Ukraine), and instead we’re seeing Russia be very reactive instead. NATO starts to build up, then Russia starts to build up. The United States helps support the revolution that took place in Ukraine this past year, Russia then takes Crimea and goes into eastern Ukraine. So it really is a reaction to what is taking place out of the United States and out of NATO.”

All of this suggests that official government sanctions may continue a good deal longer, while the EU and Asian business community increasingly ignores them. That is likely to result in increased government pressure from the U.S. business community to enable its companies to compete on and equal plane with their EU and Asian peers. This growing dichotomy between the U.S. and EU/Asia is unlikely to be long lasting, as their respective governments seek ways to avoid embarrassment in their respective business communities.

As stated by Chris Weafer, founding partner at Macro-Advisory, a Moscow consultancy, “Goods and services which in theory are subject to sanctions, in reality do not appear to be. Companies seem to be working around it. There is obviously a very big blind eye being turned” by some western governments…. “I think the basic message is if you’re not blatant about it you’re fine.”

A U.S. State Dept. representative may have let the truth slip out when he described the reaction of the State Dept. to questions from U.S. companies about attending the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. “If you tell us you’re going, we’ll probably order you not to, but if you go and don’t tell us, we’ll probably do nothing,” he said.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Do Russia Sanctions Still Exist?