Wednesday, 19 August 2015

Marshall Horn - Russia-Canada Aircraft Manufacturing Project Falls to Western Sanctions

Marshall Horn,

 

This article originally appeared in The Moscow Times


The Ulyanovsk region is abandoning plans to establish joint-production of a Canadian civilian aircraft due to Western sanctions against Russia, news agency RIA Novosti reported Monday, citing Ulyanovsk Governor Sergei Morozov.

The project was to be the first to set up shop in a special economic zone in Ulyanovsk last year, but has collapsed under the strain of political tensions between Russia and the West over the crisis in Ukraine.

Canadian aerospace firms de Havilland and Viking were to establish localized production of the civilian DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft with Ulyanovsk airplane company Vityaz, which has been a major distributor of the DHC-6 to Russian airlines.

Vityaz wanted to see production of the aircraft brought to Russia, but according to Morozov, the regional authorities have decided to end the project.

“In general, [Ulyanovsk region] has the right to pull out of this project. At any rate, we have decided ourselves to do it,” said Morozov, explaining that the decision was influenced by Western sanctions against Russia.

It is not clear how much the project would have cost, but Morozov noted that a $3.4 billion deal with another major Canadian aircraft company to produce aircraft in Ulyanovsk stalled last year amid the Ukraine crisis.

The DHC-6 Twin Otter is a much smaller aircraft than the Q400, and is a much older design — dating back to 1964. But together the Canadian aircraft deals were intended to help Russia develop production capabilities for small civilian aircraft, a segment of the market it has little experience with.Canada’s Bombardier aircraft suspended talks last year with state-owned defense technology holding Rostec to sell 100 of its Q400 airplane to Russia and set up localized production as part of a $3.4 billion deal.

As for Ulyanovsk’s special economic zone, which the DHC-6 deal was supposed to utilize, Morozov said “there is great interest from European and Russian partners to come to the special economic zone, and we will give them the space we were preparing for [the DHC-6] venture.”

The Ulyanovsk special economic zone is one of several Russian government initiatives to develop regional economies. The zones feature special tax incentives and special administrative support to make doing business in Russia easier for foreign companies.

Bombardied Dash 8 Q400


via Marshall Horn, CFTC Russia-Canada Aircraft Manufacturing Project Falls to Western Sanctions

Tuesday, 18 August 2015

Marshall Horn - World Bank: Russia Overtakes Germany as 4th Economy

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at The Unz Review


China Overtakes US, Russia Overtakes Germany. At least according to the latest revision of the World Bank’s PPP-adjusted GDP estimates.

China has long been expected to overtake the US economy (one economist dated it to as early as 2010), and there had already been a flurry in the media when the IMF claimed the same thing in December last year.

The World Bank’s new figures just confirm the new reality and scaremongering about a bad night at the irrelevant casino that is the Chinese stockmarket is not going to materially change the fact. Annual growth continues at 7% per year, much the same as South Korea when it was at a similar stage of per capita development in the 1980s.

Russia’s PPP-adjusted GDP actually marginally overtook Germany’s back in 2013, and it managed to maintain this small lead into 2014 despite falling into recession. Of course with GDP expected to fall by around 3% this year, there will almost certainly be a reversal of this, but not by any radical amount – the hystrionical pronunciations of the Western media regardless – and will likely be temporary anyway import substitution really kicks in.

Financial, military, and cultural power are all ultimately functions, if lagging functions, of productive economic power. Although it would be a bad idea to go overboard with it, the spectacle of the same year (give or take) seeing both Russia overtaking the former biggest economy in Europe, and China overtaking the former biggest economy in the world, is really quite symbolic.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC World Bank: Russia Overtakes Germany as 4th Economy

Marshall Horn - Russia's Second Quarter Contraction Is No Big Deal

Marshall Horn,

Confirmation from Rosstat - the Russian government’s statistical agency - of a 4.6% contraction in GDP in the second quarter, has led - predictably enough - to a resurgence of some of the apocalyptic predictions of the last year.

There is no justification for this. 

All recessions have their peculiar features. However he classic pattern of a recession in a market economy is that a fall in demand - usually caused by the bursting of a credit bubble - leads to a cut in production and investment, with producers preferring to draw down their existing inventories rather than buy in new products.  

In time demand recovers, production rises as demand has to be met and as depleted inventories have to be replenished, and the recession ends. 

This is the pattern the Russian economy is following.

The fall in demand that struck Russia in the early months of 2015 was not caused by the bursting of a credit bubble. The Russian authorities have a horror of bubbles, and whenever there has been any sign of such a bubble - as in the early months of 2012 - they have always acted decisively to stop it.

Rather what caused demand to fall at the start of this recession was the combination of the inflation and the high interest rates caused by last year’s devaluation of the rouble. That devaluation of the rouble was in turn caused by last year’s collapse of oil prices, energy products being for historic reasons Russia’s main export product.

In the early weeks of 2015 food price inflation in Russia was running at over 20%. By some estimates real incomes fell by as much as 9%.  

The inevitable result was a fall in demand, causing a recession.

I saw evidence of this when I visited Moscow in February, as did Dr. Gilbert Doctorow when he visited Russia a few weeks later.  It was apparent that the inflation spike was hurting badly, especially those with low and fixed incomes. 

As well as the inflation spike, the very high interest rates - caused by the Central Bank’s need to damp down inflation and to support the rouble - increased the cost of borrowing, cutting demand for expensive items such as cars that are usually bought on credit, and hitting investment.

With producers responding to the fall in demand as one would expect by cutting inventories, production inevitably fell.  

Since it takes time for information to be passed down from consumers to producers down the supply chain, the major cutbacks in production and spending took place in the second quarter rather than the first, as decisions made in the first quarter were fully implemented in the second. This is why with a GDP contraction of 4.6% in the second quarter, the recession appeared deeper in the second quarter than the first, even as sentiment in the economy actually began to improve.

This is the picture that the statistics have been reflecting. As I have pointed out on several occasions, given what happened at the end of last year it could not have been otherwise.

The point is that as the inflation spike burns its way through and as interest rates fall, demand will first stabilise and then recover.  

According to Rosstat prices stopped growing in the second half of July and weekly price inflation has now been zero for several weeks. 

This is usually the case in Russia in the summer months. However the fact that it is happening this year so soon after the inflation spike of the winter shows how quickly the situation is returning to normal.

At the same time as inflation has fallen, interest rates have been cut.

With both prices and interest rates falling, early indications are that demand has stabilised and stopped falling at its previous speed in July - and may even have increased that month.    

As always the process takes a little time to work itself through, so that while the fall in industrial output appears to have slowed in July, manufacturing continued to contract.  However as demand recovers and as it becomes necessary to replenish inventories, industrial output will rise, bringing the recession finally to an end.

As I have said previously, the Economics Ministry is predicting the end of the recession in the final quarter, and this remains its opinion and the general consensus.

This recession - as all recessions do - has exposed weaknesses in the Russian economy. Of these the most important is not that Russia’s major export is energy products. This a grossly overhyped issue that wildly overestimates the importance of foreign trade to a continental sized economy which the World Bank estimates on a purchasing power parity basis is now the fifth biggest economy in the world.  

The economy’s vulnerability to movements in oil prices is anyway now largely mitigated by the floating exchange rate (see for example the opinions of Aleksey Ulyukaev - Russia’s Economics Minister - given at the beginning of July when the oil price appeared to have recovered - about why Russia would not be worried by a $40 a barrel oil price).  

As I have also previously said, further downward movements in oil prices and the rouble are now unlikely to change the underlying inflation position or affect Russia’s recovery.

The Russian economy’s key weakness is not the fact that it exports mainly energy products, but the weakness of its financial system - a fact recently acknowledged by the Central Bank, which described Russia’s financial system as “shallow”.  

For an economy of Russia’s size the financial system is too small, which is why Russian banks and companies have until recently looked outside Russia to western Europe for part of their finance.

It is because the financial system is too small that the rouble is so volatile and the government is unwilling to run a budget or trade deficit, even at times such as these when oil prices are low and when the recession could be smoothed by the government running a bigger deficit.  

By contrast Saudi Arabia, with an economy far less diversified than Russia’s, is able to maintain a currency peg with the dollar and cover a budget deficit estimated at 20% of GDP by borrowing from its banks, which are much more liquid than Russia’s. 

The weakness of Russia’s financial system is a reflection of its youth. It has only been functioning properly for about 10 years. It would be asking a great deal to expect a financial system this young to achieve levels of depth and sophistication comparable to those of Western financial institutions in such a short time.   

The weakness and small size of Russia’s financial system is not however something written in stone.  

A country as large and wealthy as Russia can certainly develop a financial system big enough to fund the needs of its economy.  

As Russia Insider has discussed previously, the great benefit for Russia of the sanctions is precisely that it is obliging Russia to make reorganisation of its financial system a priority. 

Thus we are finally seeing steps to create a new interbank payment system alongside SWIFT, a new credit rating agency, and a new bank card independent of MasterCard and Visa, at the same time as the Central Bank has been busy withdrawing licences from unstable banks.

Above all it is reflected in the Central Bank’s and the government’s single-minded focus on reducing inflation to an annualised level of 4%. As the Russian authorities understand well, the Russian financial system cannot fully expand and modernise whilst inflation remains as high as it has historically been in Russia.

With younger people - some of whom have experience working in Western financial institutions - now joining Russia’s banks in increasing numbers, what these steps mean is that the modernisation and expansion of Russia’s financial system to the point when it finally becomes fit for purpose is now only a question of time.

In the meantime, if the recession has exposed weaknesses in Russia’s economy, it has also highlighted its strengths.

Despite the fact that the country is in recession - and despite the very high interest rates at the start of the year - there have been no mass redundancies (unemployment has barely risen), no mass plant closures, no flood of bankruptcies or of home repossessions or of farm foreclosures.  So far this has been almost entirely an output recession.

This reflects the low level of debt in the economy.  

This low level of debt is partly a reflection of a lack of investment in the economy caused by the weakness of the financial system.

It is however also a reflection of the authorities’ deep aversion to credit bubbles and the steps they have repeatedly taken to prevent them.

The result is that in Russia - as in the West until the 1980s - demand has risen on the back of higher wages, not through credit growth.

This explains the country’s resilience in the face of recession.  It is why the country can absorb the inflation and high interest rates of the start of the year, and the temporary drop in output they caused, without this affecting the country’s underlying stability.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Russia's Second Quarter Contraction Is No Big Deal

Marshall Horn - The Ruble Will Likely Keep Sliding Over the Coming Months

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at The Moscow Times


That Russian GDP contracted by 4.6 percent in the second quarter comes as no surprise. That is a preliminary estimate and may well end up closer to a 5 percent decline when the second reading is published. It will also not be a surprise if the decline in this current quarter is equally poor. But even with that worsening backdrop the full year decline should still be close to 3.5 percent rather than anything significantly worse. That is because the fourth quarter drop will be smaller and likely closer to the 2.2 percent decline recorded in the first quarter.

That, however, is not to be taken as evidence of optimism that Russia will be pulling out of the slump by year end and resuming growth; it is simply the mathematical result of the base-effect, as the economy was already in significant decline toward the end of last year.

The main factor which will determine whether the consensus is correct or overly optimistic is the ruble exchange rate. More than anything else the ruble is very much like the single bolt which holds a hang-glider together. If it breaks then the glider will fall to earth and the pilot very likely killed.

The reason why the ruble has that critical role is because, on the one side the ruble exchange rate is the end result of several other elements, such as the oil price, global currency trends and the actions of the Central Bank. On the other side are the many consequences of where the ruble trades and that list includes inflation, interest rates, the competitiveness of domestic industry and, most important, end consumer and industry owner confidence.

That the rally in the oil price, which brought Brent up to $68 p/bbl in mid-May, was unsustainable was evident. It was a speculative move prompted by optimism that the weakness of late 2014 would force U.S. shale producers to close some wells and would lead to a supply cut from OPEC. In reality nether was ever likely as U.S. producers are working on a marginal cost while Saudi Arabia has made it very clear that, for them and their core allies inside OPEC, this is a battle about longer-term market share.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has recently cut back its growth forecast for U.S. oil output but is still expected a gain from 11.9 million barrels per day (mln bbl/d) in 2014 to an average of 12.7 mln bbl/d this year and rising to 13 mln bbl/d for 2016.

Saudi Arabia has recently cut back slightly from the near record high of 10.6 mln bbl/d in produced in June but is still well ahead of the 9.6 mln bbl/d it averaged last year. On top of that, almost all other producers are pumping near maximum, including Russia which has so far been unaffected by sanctions and is pumping at a post-Soviet high.

To that we have to add some extra Iranian output. It will take many years and billions of dollars of investment to build up the country’s output to potential but it can relatively quickly add an extra 500,000 mln bbl/d. For a market which is already over-supplied by 1.5 mln bbl/d the consequences are obvious.

The other factor which is likely to hurt the oil price in the coming months is the expected rate rise by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank. The evidence is that this is a question of when rather than if. When that happens we can expect some further strengthening of the U.S. dollar and that, historically, is always a negative for the oil price.

How far the oil price may slide is always a difficult question. Traders will keep in mind the 2009 support price of $42 p/bbl while other speculators may be tempted into the market in the mid-$40’s p/bbl, as they were earlier this year, because of the risk of output disruptions from large producing nations, such as Venezuela, which are now facing severe financial problems, or as a result of an expansion of the various conflicts across the Middle East.

A voluntary cut in output by either U.S. shale producers or by Saudi Arabia seems most unlikely while any cut from Russia is impossible.

So, faced with either further weakness in the oil price or, at minimum, an extended period of low oil, what may we expect to see as a response from the Central Bank? In previous years we would have expected the Central Bank to use a period of oil stability to try and rally the ruble with interventions. Those days have gone.

Over the past six months we can see that government policy towards the ruble has shifted 180 degrees. Today the policy preference is for a weak ruble.

The key message that a weaker ruble is better than a strong ruble started to be better understood when the first quarter macro report showed a significant gain in some parts of domestic manufacturing as a result of the competitiveness boost from the ruble weakness in late 2014.

We also now hear government officials linking the more “competitive” currency with the import-substitution strategy. The same can be said for the plan to try to boost exports in sectors outside of extractive industries. A more “competitive Russia” may also become one of those slogans to be associated with this crisis.

One of the reasons why the second-quarter macro performance was weaker than in the first quarter is because the ruble strengthened too quickly over the first four months of the year. It meant that there was less of the positive import-substitution impact seen in the previous quarter. The current ruble weakness should help at least partially address that in the coming months.

The second reason why a weak ruble is now preferred is because it makes the Finance Ministry’s job of trying to keep the budget deficit low a lot easier.

So what is the ideal exchange rate? We know from comments made by both the economic development and finance ministers that they are happier with an exchange rate at 55.0 against the dollar rather than below 50. The Central Bank also supports that and announced that it would rebuild FX reserves (to a target of $500 billion) in periods where the ruble strengthened too far. At the other end of the scale an exchange rate at 65, or worse, against the dollar will start to ring inflation and confidence alarm bells.

In many ways the ruble equation is a lot less complicated than it used be. We no longer have to worry too much about speculative actions or even the contagion from Beijing’s actions, i.e. other than in so far as this may further strengthen the U.S. dollar or weaken the oil price. Today the ruble equation is a straightforward balance between where the oil price trades and what the Central Bank does in response.

The optimistic view is that, at best, both the ruble and oil will hold near current levels into the autumn. There really is no basis for assuming a meaningful rally in either over the medium term. The greater likelihood is that the price of Brent crude will drift further down in the coming weeks and that would then push the ruble into the high 60’s against the dollar.

In that event, apart from some ad-hoc interventions to prevent a steep decline or a return of volatility, there is no reason to assume the Central Bank will take any meaningful, i.e. expensive, actions to prevent the ruble sliding toward the 70 mark.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC The Ruble Will Likely Keep Sliding Over the Coming Months

Marshall Horn - Low Price Threatens Russia's Gas Pipeline Plans

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at OilPrice.com


Russia has publicly touted an array of natural gas export projects over the past year, a web of pipelines that would connect Russian gas to some of its largest customers, while also achieving important strategic objectives. But many of these projects will not come to pass.

Russia is one of the world’s largest producers of natural gas, and Europe has long been its most important customer. But that suddenly changed after the Ukraine crisis began in early 2014. Since then, Europe has made some small but important steps towards reducing its dependence on Russian gas, while weak demand, mild winters, and high levels of gas storage have all highlighted the market risk that Russia’s state-owned Gazprom runs by relying too heavily on Ukraine as a transit route, and Europe as its predominant export destination.

Moreover, pricing disputes over natural gas between Russia and Kiev have also severely damaged one of Gazprom’s key export markets: Ukraine itself. Gas exports to Ukraine fell by half in 2014.

The lower demand from Russia’s western neighbors has cut into Gazprom’s profitability. Gazprom’s exports declined 8 percent in the first half of 2015 compared to a year earlier, and in June, the company reported that its production had fallen by 19 percent compared to the same month in 2014.

For years, Russia has pursued major pipeline projects that would work around Ukraine in order to reliably export to Europe while freeing its hand in Ukraine. Those efforts have stepped up over the past year, with Russia pushing the Turkish Stream Pipeline and the expansion of the Nord Stream Pipeline.

Also, in a change of strategy, Gazprom has looked east for its future, as it sees the business climate in Europe start to sour. Concentrating on selling to China also makes sense as it is expected to see its gas consumption rise in the years to come.

However, the groundbreaking $400 billion gas deals that Russia and China agreed to in 2014 may not turn out to be the huge win that Gazprom had hoped. The deal called for a long-distance pipeline – nicknamed the “Power of Siberia” – to connect Russian gas to various points in China. Details had remained close to the vest, but Gazprom officials revealed on August 10 that the deals would leave the company vulnerable to low gas prices.

Natural gas prices have fallen in many parts of the world, dropping in concert with oil. Officials at the Russian gas company confirmed that instead of a fixed price, gas sold to China through the pipeline would be pegged to a basket of oil benchmarks, according to the FT. If low natural gas prices continue, the major pipeline deals with China would be unprofitable for Gazprom. “We have registered high risk appetite for this contract and we do not envisage such an event,” Pavel Oderov, a director at Gazprom, said. But given the fact that gas sold for $350 per thousand cubic meters at the time of the announcement, the fall of around half since then means that gas prices “could be as low as $175/thousand cubic metres — clearly a lossmaking level,” Moscow-based energy analyst Ildar Davletshin told the FT.

It isn’t just the Power of Siberia facing an uncertain future. A report last month from the Center for Strategic and International Studies outlined 10 major gas projects that Moscow has trumpeted that may not come to fruition. For example, an LNG export terminal from Vladivostok on Russia’s Pacific Coast, which would have sent Russian gas to Japan, was recently postponed.

Also, the hyped Turkish Stream Pipeline faces formidable obstacles as well. Conceived of as a competing alternative to the western backed pipeline that would connect gas from Azerbaijan to Europe, the Turkish Stream pipeline would cost $20 billion. But Gazprom and Turkey have not agreed to terms yet, and a contract with Italian company Saipem to start laying pipe was cancelled in July. Perhaps more importantly, Turkish Stream would end up competing with Gazprom’s other proposal in the Baltic Sea, the Nord Stream expansion. Nord Stream, according to CSIS, is a bit more viable, but neither of the projects have particularly good prospects at the moment.

Other proposals, such as Russia’s Altai Pipeline to western China, could go nowhere, as China would need to build a massive pipeline infrastructure to move gas from its western provinces to its major consumer markets in the east. Yamal LNG, an export terminal on Russia’s Arctic Coast, is facing obstacles, but could move forward with heavy government support.

In addition, the U.S. government just slapped sanctions on Sakhalin-3, an expansion of an LNG project on the island of Sakhalin. That could scare away international companies like Royal Dutch Shell, which had taken steps to make asset swaps with Gazprom in order to acquire a stake in the project. That could lead to delays as the project needs western technology to proceed.

Russia has put a lot of effort into building large-scale pipelines and LNG export facilities in order to expand gas sales. But many of the flagship proposals may not move forward.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Low Price Threatens Russia's Gas Pipeline Plans

Marshall Horn - Russian Startups Are Coming to the US

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared in Newsweek


In a modest two-story house on Turk Street in San Francisco, a bunch of Russians, all in their 20s, live and work together to build an app they hope will change the way you choose a restaurant for dinner and, ultimately, the way customer service works.

The spacious living room of the house serves as an office; a whiteboard with a set of goals for the day stands beside the wall; laptops are often left unguarded on the table when members of team retire to their bedrooms to get some sleep. Up to 10 people live in the house, and most of them work at Luka, a startup building an app that recommends restaurants. The idea is that instead of sifting through ratings, professional reviews and other people’s recommendations, like on Yelp or Foursquare, you can have a nice chat with a robot who presumably knows everything about good food and good fun, and learns more about you as you type. Another guy, the founder of Stampsy, a publishing platform for “visual thinkers,” moved into the house recently.

All the residents came to the U.S. from Russia. And as it turns out, they are not that exceptional. In recent years, more and more young creative entrepreneurs from Russia have decided to pursue their dreams outside the country and launch their projects abroad—mostly in the U.S., but also in other Western countries, such as England. The extent of this migration is hard to quantify, since not everybody gets the right visas right away, but it’s telling that the amount of two particular types of nonimmigrant visas granted by the U.S. embassy in Russia (L1, for employees, and O1, for “outstanding aliens”) has been steadily growing over the last five years, with the amount of L1 visas doubling from 2009 to 2014.

“More and more Russian entrepreneurs are looking into relocating to the West or opening a branch outside Russia, and I actually think it’s a positive a thing. I always urge people to think global,” says Alon Lifshitz, managing director of Blumberg Capital, a venture capital firm with headquarters in San Francisco. “They are leaving the Russian market because there is a lack of liquidity, and the local stock exchange market is very unstable, because of everything that’s going on. And Russian developers are actually very smart and capable, even though sometimes they lack in marketing and commercial abilities.”

“Russian startups are very good on the tech side, but sometimes not that good on the product side,” says Masha Drokova, a former prominent member of a Russian pro-government youth movement called Nashi. After falling out with the government’s values, she says, she started doing social media campaigns, gradually was lured into the tech industry and is now running her own PR studio helping Russian and international startups to get the word out in the U.S. and globally. Drokova says every day she gets three or four e-mails from Russian companies asking her to help them with PR in the U.S. “After the economic crisis happened, it became very clear that there isn’t simply a big enough tech market in Russia,” she added.

Among the projects created by Russian millennials who have decided to compete in the overcrowded American and European markets instead of staying in their home country are Flёve Partners, a brand and design consulting agency, based in New York; Future London Academy, a project that organizes one-week inspirational and educational workshops in design, based in England; Hopes and Fears, an English-language digital media firm focused on “life and culture through a global lens,” based in New York; San Jose-based Trucker Path, an app that connects drivers with clients, and which has been called “Uber for trucks” and just raised $20 million in Series A funding; Readymag, a Web publishing platform, based in New York; and so on.

The most well-known Russian digital runaway is arguably Pavel Durov, a co-founder and former CEO of the biggest Russian social network, VK.com. A Steve Jobs wannabe, a radical libertarian and a controversial Internet prodigy famous for such publicity stunts as throwing 5,000 ruble notes, worth about $150, out of his office window to show that “money is overrated,” Durov was pushed out of VK by his stockholders in 2014 and forced to resign. He now lives abroad (he never says where exactly, but is often seen in New York) and runs Telegram, a popular instant messenger focused on the security of users’ correspondence. In multiple interviews with the Western media, Durov has implied that the takeover of VK was orchestrated by the Kremlin. According to Durov, he repeatedly refused law enforcement’s requests to block opposition and pro-Ukrainian groups and surrender their members’ credentials. Citing other media obligations, Durov declined to comment for this article.

Considering the news that has been coming out of Russia in recent years, one might suspect the reasons for young professionals leaving the country is obvious. However, it’s more subtle than that. The reasons appear to be not so much political as economic—and even existential. In five interviews conducted for this article, the name “Putin” was not mentioned once. It’s not exactly about oppression, censorship and war; it’s more about the consequences of those things. Russia, it seems, is just bad for business.

“We knew from the beginning that America is our primary market, and if you want to work there, you have to be there. It was just more convenient for us to enter an existing market instead of starting from ground zero,” said Diana Novichikhina, a co-founder of ReadyMag, which boasts having The Guardian, BBDO and Airbnb among its 45,000 customers. She also said political concerns haven’t influenced the startup’s strategy.

“We like it in Moscow, but there just aren’t so many good professionals there, so they crowd together, and it gets cramped,” said Vit Abrams, who together with Holga Balina created Flёve Partners., an agency that works with clients like BP and won multiple design awards. “It’s easy to get noticed in Moscow, because it’s a plain field: if you stand out, you get noticed immediately. But there’s no real ecosystem. Here, it’s tougher, but you actually have a chance to become big and global.”

For Ekaterina Solomeina, a co-founder of Future London Academy who worked with the best known Moscow design agencies before moving to London, creating an ecosystem in Moscow was actually one of the goals she had in mind when starting her project. “The Russian design industry is so young, there isn’t much to be inspired by,” she told Newsweek. “In London, you’re surrounded by the best people, and you can learn from them and grow. And I want people to come here and then come back and share what they learned.”

The Future London Academy was initially created to provide educational experiences and workshops to Russian designers, but now caters to audience from all over the world. Essentially, the participants of various programs organized by the Academy (for example, “Design Management: Creative Booster”) pay to come to the British capital for a week to get introduced to the representatives of top British design firms and learn and get inspiration from them. The fee is usually somewhere in between 1,500 and 2,000 pounds ($2,300-$3,100) and includes accommodation in London.

“I didn’t leave Moscow because I didn’t like it,” Solomeina said. “I was too young to have any real problems in Russia, and Moscow is almost a country in itself anyway. I just liked London more.”

According to Roman Mazurenko, a founder of Stampsy who, as a Moscow cultural entrepreneur, helped the Russian hipster generation to evolve and find its identity in the mid-2000s, the spirit of the Russian capital nowadays just doesn’t fit people who want to keep up with the rest of the world and be on the cutting edge.

“In 2007, Moscow wasn’t really up-to-date either, but there was a dream,” he told Newsweek. “Now the dream is gone. Nowadays, moving around the world isn’t about geography, it’s about time travel. Some countries still live in the ’80s, others are going back there quickly; I am from Belorussia and I already saw everything that’s now going on in Russia happening there. The U.S., however, is a very progressive country. And it’s very important for a startup to live in the future.”

Not unlike Russian music bands that try to break into America, Russian digital entrepreneurs don’t specifically present themselves as Russian. Vasily Esmanov, the founder of Hopes & Fears who created the prominent independent media company Look At Me in Russia before expanding to New York, declined to be interviewed on the subject. “Our projects are good regardless of the fact where we’re from,” he said.

Indeed, there have been notable successes. Last year, Luka became the first Russian startup to be accepted into Y Combinator, which landed first place in a Forbes survey of American startup incubators in 2012. That allowed Luka’s team to relocate to California, where now they are closing Series A funding.

Luka founder Eugenia Kuyda, who was a well-known food writer in Moscow before getting an MBA at London Business School and becoming a digital entrepreneur, explained her reasons for moving like this: “I feel like it makes sense to do politics in Russia nowadays, or charity work. Digital startups, though, feel kind of out of place…. When you’re young, you want to dream big, to imagine where you will be in 10 years, and in Russia only insane people can seriously do that.”

“It’s just weird to think long-term if in a month the ruble can lose half of its value, in two months banks can close, and at any point somebody can come and just take over your company.”



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Russian Startups Are Coming to the US

Monday, 17 August 2015

Marshall Horn - Experts: China's Yuan Devaluation Hurts Russia Now, Could Boost It Later On

Marshall Horn,

This article originally appeared at Russia Beyond the Headlines


Beijing’s decision on Aug. 11 to devalue the Chinese yuan to its lowest rate against the U.S. dollar in nearly three years has seen the ruble slide once more: On August 12, the Russian currency fell against the U.S. dollar and the euro, reaching its lowest rate since February.

As sources at Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development told RIA Novosti, the decision by Chinese government to devalue the yuan by 1.9 percent as part of its effort to let the currency float freely threatens Russia’s economy.

“The decision by China’s Central Bank will surely increase the pressure on the currencies of all the developing countries,” the sources said.

Currency weakens

The principal consequence of the devaluation of the yuan as far as Russia is concerned is that it affects the ruble by causing oil prices to drop.

“Since China is the world’s largest consumer of fossil fuels, a weaker yuan puts pressure on oil prices, which has an impact on the Russian economy,” said Anton Krasko, chief analyst at MFX Capital.

Following the devaluation on Aug. 12, Brent crude for September fell to $49.22 a barrel on London’s ICE exchange. The strength of the Russian ruble depends directly on oil prices.

In late 2014, Russian authorities also devalued the country’s currency, with the ruble losing almost half of its value against the U.S. dollar and the euro that year. After a 25 percent gain in May 2015, the ruble fell back again in August, losing the gain completely.

According to experts, the main reason for the ruble’s fall is the falling oil prices.

“The Russian currency is in an uncontrollable dive. In contrast, the Chinese authorities have every opportunity to keep their currency stable,” said Krasko.

Nevertheless, the analyst said Russia’s central bank had originally planned to implement a similar policy of controlled devaluation, selling U.S. dollars to support the ruble if it reached the limits of the established currency corridor.

In fact, Russia’s Central Bank sold $27.2 billion in October 2014 to keep the currency afloat.

Supporting the industry

The 1.9 percent devaluation of the yuan against the dollar represents the sharpest fall the Chinese currency has experienced over the past 20 years.

China’s central bank pledged to maintain a stable and “reasonable” exchange rate for the currency, while also making it more market-oriented.

In June, Chinese exports declined by 8.3 percent because of the fall in demand from the country’s three largest trade partners: the EU, the United States and Japan.

According to Dmitry Bedenkov, chief analyst at investment company Russ-Invest, the efforts of China to stimulate its economy will be favorable to the world economy in general.

“The good health of the Chinese economy will be especially important for the raw materials markets,” he said, adding that the recent drop in oil prices is partially due to concerns over Chinese growth slowing down.

However, Russia’s regulator expressed hope that China’s decision would eventually help to stimulate the price of oil and boost the ruble.

“In the mid-term, it is to be expected that a weaker yuan will help China to increase exports and stimulate growth. This will eventually have a positive impact on global commodity prices – including oil prices, which in turn will strengthen the ruble,” Russia’s Central Bank said in a statement.



via Marshall Horn, CFTC Experts: China's Yuan Devaluation Hurts Russia Now, Could Boost It Later On